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Title: Homeless in the Homeland: housing protests in Kazakhstan 
 
Abstract: 
The paper tracks housing protests in Kazakhstan’s former capital city, Almaty from 
1989 to 2016 for what they reveal about shifting ideas of rights and obligations 
between citizens and state. Three broad models of moral economies of housing 
emerge. First, the Soviet period, where equal access to housing was nominally in 
return for labour. Second, the early Republican period when pro-Kazakh policies 
favoured previously marginalized ethnic Kazakhs, and, third, the years from 2004, 
when the country’s wealth increased before the 2008 crash and the plunging value 
of the local currency. This was when a professional class became increasingly 
valorized with housing support mechanisms created specifically for them. The 
various protests highlight the failures of each model to provide secure, adequate 
housing. A constant theme of ‘illegal legality’ and informal practices, variously 
construed by citizens as moral, pragmatic or immoral, has consistently undermined 
both the achievement of housing promises and the safety and security of housing. 
The article explores the paradox of why citizens continue to demand help and 
interventions from the state amidst such pervasive untrustworthiness. 
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In 2008, the economic crisis revealed the fragility of Kazakhstan’s oil economy. After 
three devaluations, the local currency (tenge) was floated in 2015, its value plunging by a 
further 23%. One effect was that many holders of dollar-pegged mortgages found 
themselves unable to repay credit installments on tenge salaries. Some developers were 
bankrupted; others fled with deposits leaving half-finished buildings and penniless, 
homeless shareholders (Rolnik, 2011). Kazakhstan’s central bank governor observed 
bluntly, “This is a market-driven decision. This is not socialism. We could not protect 
everything.” (Farchy, 2015). But a quite different understanding of the authorities’ 
obligations to protect citizens in need of housing appeared in the demonstrations which 
have rippled across Kazakhstan’s major cities since 2008, claiming help with housing 
from the government and banks. Mortgage holders went on hunger strike in 2009 in an 
apartment adorned with a large poster ‘Government! Help your people!’ In another 
typical protest in Almaty,i Kazakhstan’s former capital, crowds belonging to the 
‘Housing for People!’ movement, marched on banks, banging pots, chanting ‘Down with 
banks!’, demanding loan terms to be reformulated and repossessions to cease. In 2016, 
local media reported suicide from self-immolation as a shocking new form of protest by 
despairing mortgage holders.  
 
What is striking is that most of these protestors could be defined as middle-class, 
possessing qualifications, relatively secure jobs, in a middle-income bracket and aspiring 
or actual property owners (Daly, 2005). In common with much of the contemporary 
world (Sabaté, 2016 and Bruun, this vol.), urban home ownership in Kazakhstan now 
confers status, and, arguably, is morally charged as an index of individual financial 
security and autonomy, characteristics that are valorised in a neoliberal cosmology. As 
Muehlebach (2012) suggests, neoliberalism and capitalism are as moralised as any other 
system. More than this, the middle class is the basis for Kazakhstan’s 2050 National 
Strategy’s ambition to become a global economic player and politically stable. ‘[T]he 
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middle class’, wrote President Nazarbayev in 2004, ‘has something to lose, … does not 
want revolution, does not want changes in … laws and is a stabilizer and bulwark of the 
state.’ (Ostrowski, 2012: 246). Further, Nazarbayev’s Decree 1388 in 2004 named ‘the 
middle class as the intended direct beneficiary of the government’s housing construction 
programme’ (Daly, 2005: 8-9), establishing mortgage mechanisms specifically to help 
middle-income employees get a foot on the property ladder amidst Kazakhstan’s 
delirious housing bubble 2004-2008.  
 
These support initiatives, plus subsequent demands for the government and banks to 
intervene in the effects on housing of a nose-diving economy, indicate close links 
between secure housing provision and conceptions, or expectations, of citizenship and the 
state; though when the apparent bulwark of the state protests against homelessness, its 
foundations begin to seem rather shaky. There are resonances here with symbolic 
associations made elsewhere in the world between housing, the state and the ideal citizen 
(see Bruun and the Introduction to this vol.). In Kazakhstan, these links are both 
confirmed and complicated by taking a longer view.  
 
This article explores two related themes in struggles for decent housing. The first traces 
how the housing protests described above are just the latest in a series where the 
connection between citizenship, models of the state, tenure and rights to housing has been 
both a constant—and constantly reconfigured. Housing in Kazakhstan therefore reveals a 
series of overlapping ways in which broader moral economies have been imagined and 
practised from the Soviet period on. As Thompson (1971) describes, one configuration is 
not neatly supplanted by another (see also Koch this vol); the habitus and expectations of 
previous vertical relationships between authorities and people remains for some people 
while new expectations emerge.  
 
In summary, in the Soviet period rights to housing were (nominally) granted in return for 
labour. This was enshrined in Article 44 of the 1977 Soviet Constitution, the first 
Constitution explicitly guaranteeing housing to all USSR citizens. Then, with perestroika 
in the 1980s, nationalist moves to self-determination, or at least to equal rights with more 
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privileged non-titular groups, began to merge ideas of rights to a home and homeland. 
When the new Republic emerged in 1991, Kazakhs numbered less than 40% of the 
population, potentially querying the legitimacy of a Kazakh government. Pro-Kazakh 
affirmative actions (Bassin, 2016: 281) began to appear, including offers of housing and 
land particularly to repatriate Kazakhs (oralman). As the country stabilised, however, the 
emphasis on labour returned, but of the kind that underpins a knowledge economy. 
Tensions continue over whether the country should emphasise a nationalist or a civic 
basis to the state (Kudaibergenova, 2015).  
 
Until recent protests by mortgage defaultees, housing protests were largely associated 
with  marginalised Kazakhs; it is these demonstrations which are the main ethnographic 
focus below. I opened with recent middle-class demonstrations, however, to highlight 
first, shifts in how citizenship and housing rights have been conceived, second that 
distinct groups have called on the authorities for help with housing and, third, that no 
alliances have formed between various groups who apparently have common cause. 
Although there is a continuing sense that the authorities have some responsibilities 
towards citizens, it is hard to discern moral commnities of the kind described by 
Thompson (1971) or as Chatterjee suggests have emerged in India around campaigns for 
improved infrastructure (2004). 
 
 The second theme is how malfeasance has long undermined both equality in housing 
provision and assurance that housing was adequate and secure. Illicit preferential 
treatment for different groups at different times has eroded equality and created a murky 
arena in which citizens’ struggle to engage with authorities (see Reeves 2015 on similarly 
ambiguous areas in Moscow). This space is partly shaped by dissonances between law 
‘on the books’ and in practice, but also how citizens act and morally rationalise those 
actions, all of which are rooted in the Soviet period. Thus, the divergence between legal 
code and practice is rooted in revolutionary logic where state and leadership were above 
the law (Ioffe and Maggs, 1983: 1-2). Corruption, described below by one informant as 
‘illegal legality’, appears as the immoral use of state-controlled resources including 
housing/land allocation and, vitally for this account, regulation which ensures safe and 
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decent homes. Such corruption is typically through legal or regulatory deviation but can 
also appear through the enactment of law on the books: as I discuss below, formalising 
informal property rights can lead to homelessness.  
 
The Soviet institution of ‘blat’—the illict appropriation of public resources through 
informal connections (svyazi) or acquaintances (znakomyye) across public and private 
spheres—also continues. Crucially, as Ledeneva (1998) and Urban (2010: 99-100) 
describe, blat is based on misrecognition: it is morally censured and what other people 
do. For those who perform such actions, they are typically construed positively as mutual 
help in a context of need and indeed not necessarily called blat. Money payments, or 
bribes, are more commonly seen negatively, occasionally contrasted with the lesser evil 
of blat. However, while citizens’ negative statements about pervasive corruption are 
commonplace (Oka 2013), so too is the recognition that in order to live in the city, or cut 
through impossible red tape, they too must sometimes act in ways that range from the 
illegal, but morally legitimate, to the immoral and illegal. Thus two axes might be 
imagined of the legal/illegal and the moral/immoral where legal codes or practice may be 
understood as either moral or immoral in their purpose or effect. Illegal actions may 
likewise be cast as moral by citizens, insofar as they are pragmatic responses to 
bureaucratic gordion knots.  
 
One effect of these ambiguous, uncertain spaces is that citizens cannot simply take on or 
use the law, as Holston describes in his account of insurgent citizenship (2008). Instead, 
alongside courts that regularly merge state and commercial interests (Rolnik, 2011), there 
are complex waters for citizens to chart between legal and moral domains. Further, 
securing housing means the homeless, or potentially so, must contend with multiple 
layers of ‘authorities’: banks and politicians plus officials at state, city and local levels. 
These various bodies may variously offer or withdraw support, exact bribes, or try to 
destroy houses and expel residents; they are experienced as aphasic, corrupt, 
unpredictable, and sometimes violent.  
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The rest of this article is in three sections. The first, sketches Almaty’s troubled housing 
history and the initial protest in 1989 for housing particularly for marginalised, ethnic 
Kazakhs. The next section describes the development of Shanyrak, a periurban settlement 
in a hazardous area where people, land and housing illustrate the legal and moral 
ambiguities outlined above. The third part describes a violent, attempted eviction in 
Shanyrak in 2006, its subsequent resistance and measures introduced to address housing 
problems, all of which, ultimately emerge as failures of care. The sections illustrate the 
shifts in privileging different groups of citizens, or attributes, for housing support: rights 
through labour, common ethnicity, or specific capacity and attainment. The conclusion 
explores the paradox that, in such a context of pervasive uncertainty and 
untrustworthiness, people still appeal to the state for protection. 
Almaty and the Soviet social contract: shortage, complaint and protest 
The Soviet city was the engine of socio-economic progress and the means to a complete 
life with access to all a city afforded (Alexander and Buchli, 2004); moving to the city 
was an aspiration for many. But in Almaty, as with many Soviet cities, population growth 
was controlled. Introduced in 1932 to curb rural migration to the major cities (Matthews 
1993), the propiska was a permit to live in one specified city (or village), was essential 
for work there but did not indicate a specific dwelling. Illustrating how such moves were 
often effected, Dave quotes one woman remembering, ‘I came to Almaty with my mother 
in 1957 from our native village… Relatives … found a place for us to stay, and used their 
connections to find her a job in order to get a propiska’ (2007: 62). It was the ultimate 
Catch 22: no work without a propiska, and no propiska without work – unless informal 
connections were able to secure one or the other.  
But there were further problems. Chronic urban housing shortages were an abiding 
feature of the Soviet Union (Andrusz, 1984; Sillince, 2014). By the late 1980s, many 
people, with a propiska for Almaty, had been waiting since the 1970s for an apartment to 
be allocated to them, either squashing in with relatives or renting accommodation in 
hostels or the self-built houses, largely to the city’s north, which frequently lacked central 
heating, sewerage and internal running water (Anon, 1987a: 2). The housing shortage 
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was  exacerbated by unequal allocation which, in Kazakhstan, had an ethnic dimension. 
Almaty was largely Russophone and mainly Russian (Dave, 2007); in the 1989 census, 
Kazakhs were only 22% of the city’s population.  
The small town was poorly sited for rapid expansion. The city’s south is bounded by 
mountains, which occasionally suffer devastating mudslides. The northwest is swampy 
and crossed by a large, high-pressure gas pipe and high voltage pylons, which meant it 
was formally classified as a dangerous area. The three rivers running across the city from 
the mountains regularly flood. Building up was not an option since the area is seismic and 
technologies had not yet been developed for safe, high-rise constructions. During the 
Soviet period, building in hazardous or ‘red zone’ areas was forbidden. These restrictions 
were upheld. Numerous City Departments monitored and regulated their specialist areas 
in and around Almaty but, after 1991, effective funding was lost (Kuratov, 2004) and 
enforcement of restrictions became variable or absent. 
 
The housing crisis was one of the major political issues during perestroika. With glasnost 
in the air, newspapers in the late 1980s railed against preposterous housing queues and 
breaches of housing allocation mechanisms. Ethnic inequalities were not mentioned. 
Local official newspapers reported daily on Almaty’s housing crisis. Almaty’s 
construction company, ADK, summarised problems as late and poor quality materials, 
few skilled builders, lack of local capacity for making prefabricated concrete panels—
observing that ironically, one of the longest accommodation queues was within the 
construction sector itself with 2,100 families (ADK, 1987:2-3). There were said to be 
over half a million families waiting for homes in Kazakhstan, at least 20,000 in Alma-Ata 
(ibid). Housing stock (including many state apartments) was low quality, maintenance 
either inadequate or absent, particularly in districts beyond the prestigious centre. The 
Chief Engineer was named, shamed and sacked for poor work (Anon, 1987c: 2). 
Corruption in the allocating organisations was regularly cited where officials took better 
apartments for themselves, giving others to people either not in the housing queue or with 
years to wait; officials were named and their dismissal detailed (Anon, 1987a: 2). The 
implication was that this distribution was via blat. 
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In 1987, Kazakhstan’s First Secretary announced a housing programme, Zhiloy-91, to 
address the 27th All-Union Party Congress’ dictum that, by 2000, all families would have 
an apartment. Ambitious plans for increased housing were demanded from municipal 
authorities and workplaces and a third work shift recommended for accelerating ADK’s 
construction schedule. A new scheme was introduced for young people to build 
apartment blocks for themselves (Anon, 1987b). Almaty’s Chief Architect, Bayamurzaev 
noted the limitations to Almaty’s expansion (the impossibility of expanding to the south 
and north west was then a given), suggesting that ‘old, uncomfortable houses and blocks 
should be demolished to make way for modern, higher density buildings’ (1987:3). He 
also pleaded with Almaty’s factory directors to stop inviting workers (and providing 
propiskas) without accommodation being in place. However, lack of funding meant little 
happened apart from cries that something must be done.  
 
Then, in 1989, a housing movement for homeless Kazakhs, Asar (‘co-operation’ in 
Kazakh), started in Almaty. Young Kazakhs began to occupy unused apartments and 
protest against the exclusion of Kazakhs from their capital, making it apparent that the 
myth of equal citizenship was riven by ethnic difference (Alexander, 2009). ‘Home’, in 
these protests, began to be inflected with the rights of Kazakhs to take advantage of what 
a home in the right place (Almaty) offered, merging demands for housing and increased 
ethnic self-determination.  
 
‘We wrote endless letters to the authorities,’ Rustam, one of Asar’s organisers, then a 
Komsomol member, said,  
 
‘we said they were breaking the law which said housing should be provided. We 
asked why there were empty apartments when there were homeless people. At this 
time, Almaty’s population had only 22% Kazakhs. So we said: why were Kazakhs in 
their own land not able to have a better life, to get an education and have a good job? 
The authorities ignored us.  
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So we told them that we were thousands strong and would do something extreme if 
we were not given land. Still they ignored us.  
 
So we occupied areas outside the city like Shanyrak. Still they gave us no land, and 
no propiska. We occupied areas inside the city, empty apartments, apartments that 
had been turned into workshops instead of places for people to live! There were 
thousands! Then in October 1990 we organised a hunger strike in front of the 
parliament with thousands of supporters.  
 
We said, ‘we will die here so that these other people can have land.’ 
 
Appealing to the law, here Article 44, was a traditional tactic of Soviet dissidents who 
called on the authorities to abide by the Soviet Constitution (Glazov, 1985:105), 
highlighting discrepancies between law and practice. As noted above, such dissonance is 
rooted in the Soviet period when practical enforcement was on the basis of unpublished 
regulations, secret instructions and administrative orders (Ioffe and Maggs, 1983: 24, 
103), producing law in practice that was often arbitrary and coercive (Schwartzman, 
1986: 687). Such arbitrariness opened up a space where blat could ensure both legal 
rights and illegal favours, when enactment of the law could not be assumed. 
 
Rustam commented that the occupation emphasised apartments not being used for their 
proper purpose, thus referencing Article 1 of the initial Civil Code, expanded in the 1964 
revision (Article 5) to ‘protect civil rights (of dwelling) except when exercised in 
contradistinction to their socio-economic purpose’. The protest thus suggested that the 
authorities were misusing apartments and therefore deviating from the Code. So far, the 
protests had a familiar form (letters, hunger strikes, pot banging, and marches) and basis 
(dereliction of legal duties). However, claiming rights through blood not just citizenship 
and the law was new.  
 
Although today most citizens have forgotten these glasnost/perestroika housing protests, 
they were a significant turning point in the country’s history. In summary, interests 
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coalesced between influential proponents of the emerging nation-state and Kazakhs 
without housing or land in Almaty. A few Kazakh senior officials in the city 
administration quietly backed the protests, providing land for young urban Kazakhs with 
no home of their own and Kazakhs from rural areas and abroad. Much of this land was in 
a district called Shanyrak, in Almaty’s boggy northwestern reaches.  
 
Shanyrak: Kazakh nation-state, home—and land of documents 
The emergence and development of Shanyrak reveals the fluidity of how citizenship and 
attendant rights have been conceptualised and practised since the late 1980s and early 
1990s. When the new Republic emerged in 1991, Almaty’s mayor (Akim), Zamanbek 
Nurkadilov, called for young Kazakhs to come and make a home in their homeland’s 
capital. Housing—not just anywhere, but in the capital with all it afforded—was 
fleetingly the informal basis of a new social contract where rights were through Kazakh 
ethnicity. 
 
A series of documents controls and legitimises the right to property and the city. These 
documents are: title deeds to land, certificates from five committees (Fire, Sanitary, Land, 
Akimat [city administration] and Architecture), which together allow a ‘technical 
passport’ for a house to be issued and legal ownership, which, in turn, opens up the 
possibility of a propiska, that unlocks social benefits, including, ironically, public 
housing as well as access to formal work and credit. These documents can be arbitrarily 
deployed and are frequently modified. The novelty is that contemporary propiskas are 
linked to a specific dwelling.  
 
The process of obtaining land and house documents is so opaque, lengthy, changeable 
and expensive that a widespread procedure is to build illegally and then register a house, 
providing the timing meets a ‘wave’ of posthoc legislation (see below) or the applicant 
pulls strings (blat) and/or pays. Obtaining documents is time-consuming. It can take years 
to sort out paperwork, as many Shanyrak residents wearily explained, one laughingly 
saying that Kazakhstan was in fact Qaghazstan: ‘land of documents’. After seven years of 
piecemeal building, he observed that his retrospective application for registration was 
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approved and signed off by ‘the five committees’ without any inspection for regulatory 
compliance. Indeed, his house remains incomplete for want of money although its legal 
form is entire. As is common, he found a friend of a friend in the local Akimat to usher 
the registration through. Although he did not call this po blaty (via blat), this is how it 
works. When due process becomes practically impossible, such informal mechanisms to 
acquire rights, take on a legitimate if not entirely moral hue.  
After 1991, many Kazakhs moved to Almaty without propiskas, claiming a right to live 
in their capital, answering Nurkadilov’s call. From their perspective, moral right trumped 
the law. One such was Bazargul, a Shanyrak resident, now in her 60s, who recalled 
leaving her village and moving to Almaty in 1992. Her account echoed her neighbours’. 
She sold her animals and moved to Shanyrak where they were given land, built a two-
room vremiyanka (lit. ‘temporary house’), in which she, her husband and twelve children 
lived for eleven years. ‘Then,’ she said, ‘all this was just mud, we wore plastic bags on 
our feet because we had no money for rubber boots.’ She secured a propiska via this 
house.  
For those without a house it has become increasingly difficult to obtain a propiska. In the 
1990s, informal markets emerged in fake propiskas and residents offering their address 
for cash but, in 2010, harsher restrictions were introduced in Almaty (Yaskevich and 
Toguspaev, 2014). Formal rental agreements suffice, but cheaper rentals, where tenants 
crush together to save expense, are typically undeclared to avoid taxation, based on oral 
agreements and thus cannot be used as an address (cf Osmonova 2016). Those most in 
need of housing and welfare are therefore unlikely to qualify, hovering in the margins as 
indeterminate citizens,ii paying off policemen with bribes, buying expensive fake 
documents and risking fines much as Reeves (2015) and Höjdestrand (2009) show for 
immigrants and the homeless in Moscow and St Petersburg. Those without propiskas 
generally shrugged, construing these actions as the penalty for lacking the right 
documents but aware that policemen were likely to pocket fines. They were more voluble 
about the iniquity of not being granted a propiska, despite frequent requests, believing 
they had a moral right to one as Kazakhs. The sharp difference between this and the 
ambiguous spaces of personal rule and official corruption that Central Asian immigrant 
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workers negotiate in Moscow, is that such spaces can be equally uncertain in Almaty for 
Kazakh nationals and, on occasion, the middle class, regardless of ethnicity. 
In 2000,iii when I started fieldwork in Shanyrak, it was still bare fields studded with small 
shacks. There were no utilities. Land was obtained through many means and different 
prices paid. Some had been allocated land gratis, as in Bazargul’s case, others were 
squatting, explaining (some tongue in cheek) that everyone in Kazakhstan with a house 
was entitled to the land on which it stood, so they had decided to take up their entitlement 
in Almaty rather than in their village. Some had paid the then official price of $500 for 
deeds, others unwittingly paid considerably more to corrupt local officials, while many 
were victims of a common scam buying fake deeds, only discovered when another family 
turned up with official deeds to the same plot. Few were evicted; at this time possession 
counted for something. Officials in the 1990s often lacked knowledge of what they were 
supposed to do but many embraced the confusion of the times to secure illegal income. 
The ramifications of that period persist. 
 
Occasionally, residents said, a city official would arrive and say houses should not be 
built in boggy areas, but little happened. Again, housebuilders knew that technical 
passports could only be granted to ‘red brick’ (kirpich) houses, said to be seismically 
safe, which were too expensive for most; a single layer of red bricks was therefore either 
applied to the outside of adobe houses ‘like a skin’, in their words, to fool officials or 
homeowners just shrugged. Legalising a house was a luxury when many remained 
incomplete for want of money to buy materials. Abandoned houses were swiftly 
cannibalised for bricks, wood and glass. Occasional requests were made to the Akimat 
for improved infrastructure, but most residents muttered that this was ‘an illegal district’, 
meaning many people and houses were not ratified and certificated. The state’s absence, 
in such circumstances was, for some, a boon. The mass of documents required to 
regularise property at this point often outweighed the benefits for residents. No-one 
seemed aware that title deeds had been given for hazardous land. 
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Elsewhere, Almaty’s housing landscape continued to change in respect of who had access 
to what and how rights were understood and practised. With the 1991 Government 
Programme of Privatisation, the process of devolving ownership of state apartments to 
sitting tenants speeded up; effectively, concretising Soviet-era urban inequalities 
(Alexander, 2009). As the oil-based economy boomed from the late 1990s Almaty’s 
wealth grew. It became difficult for young urban dwellers to buy an apartment; physical 
shortage now exacerbated by spiraling costs. Mirroring housing market dynamics 
elsewhere, a housing bubble emerged, partly supported by investing new wealth in 
property, new mortgage availability for middle incomes, the urge among owner occupiers 
to maximize the value of what was now a tradeable asset (Bissenova, 2009) and the sense 
that owning not renting signified status and security. Almaty’s 2002 General Plan 
designated tracts of the city, including peri-urban settlements, for demolition to make 
way for infrastructural and elite housing developments 
 
Shanyrak 2006: violence, resistance and illegal legality in the homeland 
By 2006, Almaty’s development plan was being implemented via acquisitions of urban 
land, often entailing dispossessions and contested compensation claims. Shanyrak’s 
residents say it was destined for luxury housing. On 14th July 2006, warning was given 
that 115 houses would be demolished in Shanyrak the following morning. A few 
individuals roused neighbours to action, responding to armed riot police with Molotov 
cocktails and stones. There were injuries on both sides, a policeman died from burns and 
500 shacks were obliterated. The event made global headlines as a human rights violation 
(Kozhahmetov, 2012, Rolnik, 2011; Yessenova, 2010). The questionable legality of this 
police action, alongside the earlier allocation of unsafe land plots that violated red zone 
restrictions, prompted Adilbek, a local NGO leader, to describe the area’s history as one 
of ‘illegal legality’, blaming the authorities for their failure to abide by the law, echoing 
Soviet protests.  
 
‘After the conflict,’ Adilbek observed, ‘the Akimat, the land committee and the lawyers 
gave their permission for this land to be legalised in only 10 minutes! They were scared.’ 
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This legalisation was only partly enforced, although many citizens also said it was 
unenforceable, a meaningless populist move to quash discontent. 
 
The symbolic effect of Kazakh armed police attacking Kazakhs was profound. A 
shanyrak is a yurt’s smokehole; it also signifies Kazakh lineage and embellishes state 
emblems. The government’s website explains that the shanyrak ‘is a symbol of common 
home and common homeland of all people living in Kazakhstan’. After the clashes, 
however, the word that encapsulates shelter, nation and homeland is also shorthand for 
both the state’s savagery to its own people and for a particular kind of social unrest. 
‘These areas are nicknamed Almaty’s Shahid Belt,’ Adilbek said, ‘explosive belts worn 
by suicide bombers … and triggered by someone else. You see, these people come from 
many different places in Kazakhstan and they don’t know how to protest like urban 
people. So the government is afraid because the Shanyrak event showed these people will 
stand up to armed police for their homes because they have nothing else and nowhere 
else to go’.  
 
Adilbek’s comments indicate a new disjuncture between the Kazakh state and Kazakhs 
who had moved to the city from rural areas or abroad. The ephemerality of the earlier 
moment during the new Republic’s emergence when the authorities and Kazakh people 
appeared to have common cause was illustrated by this violent attempt to evict peri-urban 
dwellers and their resistance. The event revealed the gap between rich and poor, a gap 
that is increasingly racialised as extremes of wealth, influence and poverty both seem to 
be dominated by Kazakhs (Junisbai, 2014: 1246; Sanghera et al, 2012).  
 
Not all residents chose outright defiance. Some rapidly moved away, frightened by the 
confrontation, many were reluctant to discuss what had happened. Older residents such as 
Bazargul found themselves caught in a conflict between a habitus of compliance, a sense 
of betrayal by the authorities and resentment towards some neighbours. She described 
how in 2005 she had complied with the Akimat’s order to destroy her house and return 
her swampy land, only to find, after the event in 2006, that the land was re-legalised and 
a neighbour had taken it, to Bazargul’s fury. ‘I became homeless in my motherland,’ she 
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said, wondering whether or not she should have obeyed the authorities. Her indignation 
was at the violation of an understanding that meek compliance would be rewarded. She 
did not question the rapid reversal of decisions: that marshy land could be legally bought, 
declared off limits and then re-legalised but was confounded by state officials failing to 
intervene when ‘her’ land had been appropriated.  
 
Although Bazargul (like many of her neighbours) cited her ethnicity as her entitlement to 
land, she further distinguished between her rights as a dutiful citizen and the opportunist 
(also Kazakh) who took her land. Her qualifications became even more pronounced as 
she discussed her oralman (repatriate Kazakh) neighbours: 
 
‘They are rich because they know how to live in these times.  
But we were brought up in the Soviet times. Then, when you looked at an apple you 
couldn’t just take it. You had to ask permission. You had to say, ‘Please 
grandmother, may I eat this apple?’  
It’s the same with land. You can’t just take it as you want. You have to ask… But 
oralman don’t do this. They just come and look and say ‘oh! This land is empty. I’ll 
make it mine. 
And now they have made their roots here (zhergelikte osip ketti)’ 
 
Despite Bazargul’s tirade, many oralman also speak of returning to the homeland, have 
come from formerly Soviet countries and therefore share the Soviet habitus to which she 
refers. Nevertheless, Bazargul called on different communities, relations, habituses and 
practices at different times to make her claims or to frame appropriate behaviour that 
justified claims (cf Flynn’s article on rights through performed obedience, this vol). 
Although rights through blood to the land and the city, echoing nationalist rhetoric, had 
impelled her move to the city, she rejected the oralman and many Kazakh neighbours as 
rivalrous groups. The protestors who had emerged in extremis first, as Asar and then 
resisting demolition, never became a lasting community. Nor did the occasional local 
lobbying groups for improved infrastructure endure, instead dissipating into factions 
based on the regions from which people had originated.  
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Yessenova (2012) notes that despite the President’s declaration that Shanyrak’s housing 
should be legalised, four years later, some residents were still waiting for formalised 
property rights and suggests that once the economy recovers, the property rights of the 
poor may once again be overturned. To describe this liminal status of not knowing if, or 
for how long, claims will be upheld, she uses Smart’s evocative term for squatters in 
Hong Kong of ‘borrowed places’ (1992). In other words, they lack the security to make a 
house a home. Nonetheless, after the clashes, there were a series of state interventions 
and investments in Shanyrak. 
 
These scrubby areas were united into their own district in 2008 with its own court, tax 
office and Akimat, funded from the State and Almaty’s city budget. The local Akimat 
increased and improved the infrastructure. It might seem as though social protection was 
offered after Shanyrak’s residents resisted semi-legal coercion, a double movement. But 
the question of formalising property rights is complex. The status of land in Shanyrak in 
the early years varied from squats, to fake registration, formally-registered plots given 
gratis or bought. But, as Adilbek noted, formal title deeds were allocated for plots known 
to be boggy or over Shanyrak’s high-pressure gas pipe or below high voltage electricity 
pylons violating safety norms. Formalising these property rights would at worst be an 
abandonment of care, at best, technically illegal. However, occasional interventions to 
move people away from hazardous land, have been overwritten by various ‘waves’ of 
legislation: formalising land grabs, confirming previous deeds or unsanctioned house 
building. The most recent Legalisation Law 30 July 2015 (No. 213-V 3RK) states that its 
purpose is ‘to reduce the size of the shadow economy and include additional funds and 
property into the main economy’, i.e. to increase state revenues not citizen security. In 
2016, the President declared the programme so successful it would be extended. 
 
Houses over the gas pipe have now been removed but those under the pylons remain, as 
do many in swampy areas. In 2009, (re)legalised houses were flooded. In neighbouring 
Algabas district, legalised houses on marshy land, were swept away by floods in three 
successive years. Across the city, land and housing that have been legalised after 
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construction is also regularly flooded or destroyed in mudslides. Such catastrophes were 
exceptional in the Soviet period but are now regular, devastating occurrences.    
 
The Government’s Affordable Housing-2020 programme, established June 2012 is 
‘aimed at the comprehensive solution of the housing problems’ (Samruk Kazyna, n.d.), 
suggesting planned welfare to protect citizens.  Yet, there have been endless complaints. 
The local Akimat began building housing blocks for those in need, but the quality was 
described as ‘disgusting’ by residents. Newspaper reports showed leaks so bad that 
wallpaper billowed out and plaster crumbled under large, weeping, ceiling stains. 
Another building has been nicknamed The Tower of Pisa for its list. These problems are 
rife across Kazakhstan (Urazova 2015).  
 
Moreover, public housing misappropriation by the bank established to fund affordable 
homes, was reported in October 2015 when the President’s Strategy website said that the 
‘top official of the bank and his family members had received apartments under the 
Affordable Housing Programme’ and that, as a consequence, the Board Chairwoman had 
been removed. The failure of the state to fulfil its duty of care in providing adequate 
housing, and indeed fair allocation, echoes the complaints of the 1980s. The mortgages 
that the Programme offered to those in state or secure employment, were ultimately 
compromised by the Central Bank’s decision to devalue and float the local currency. 
Arguably, the Affordable Housing Programme and Legalization Laws play out as 
pacifiers or even a ‘deal’, echoing previous deals made by the Soviet regime to keep the 
show on the road (Dunham, 1990; Millar, 1987), but ones that have ended up creating 
inadequate and insecure housing at best, homelessness at worst.  
 
Conclusion 
Three models emerge linking home, citizen and state, each model implying a different 
moral economy. Thus the ideal, unrealized, Soviet model was for all citizens to have a 
state apartment with all modern conveniences (see Johnson, this vol) in return for labour. 
The metaphor of the USSR as a communal apartment has also been used, sometimes 
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ironically, to evoke the sense of an overarching polity/shelter within which there are 
separate ethnic Republics/rooms (Vareikis, 1924: 59; Slezkine, 1994).  
 
The second model associates the Kazakhs’ ancestral lands with the yurt-as-home, 
increased numbers of Kazakhs, alongside other pro-Kazakh policies, while also 
attempting a discourse of multiethnic equality: which appears as internationalism with a 
Kazakh face (Schatz, 2000). This model emphasises rights through blood. The third 
model still foregrounds an ancestral homeland but, as described above, frames the nation-
state’s stability and future as resting on a knowledge economy and a professional, 
property-owning class. Perhaps partly recognising of the pervasive distrust in the law, the 
President’s preface to the Strategy mentions that, ‘we must pay serious attention to the 
incompleteness and instability of our legislation. It is not enough to build a foundation; it 
must be substantiated with floors, walls, roof and all’. But the gap between such 
pronouncements and action is all too familiar. It is not only the authorities’ failure to 
enact their legal responsibilities, or their arbitrary practices that have caused distress, 
protest and a sense of betrayal, but the creation of laws that have legalised houses in 
hazardous areas. 
 
This situation suggests a paradox: given the omnipresent untrustworthiness of various 
state levels, why does anyone bother to protest or feel betrayed? What lived sense, if any, 
of moral economy survives beyond different models of citizenship that fail in practice? 
After all, there have been several ambitious government housing programmes from 
1989’s Zhiloy-91 to the Affordable Housing Programme, all described by one informant 
as political posturing. None achieved its goal. Almaty’s Akimat has variously given and 
repossessed land, sometimes violently, established a local infrastructure, constructed 
abysmal social housing and ignored its own red zones. Bar the credit schemes and the 
violence, many unfulfilled promises echo the late Soviet period, perhaps recapitulating 




The key difference is the new lack of regulatory oversight since 1991. This, above all, is 
where laments and protests are focused now: the authorities’ failure to oversee safety 
whether environmental (flooding, mudslides, earthquakes), construction (housing and 
location) and now financial (devaluation). Such expert knowledge and appropriate 
intervention is still a lingering expectation it seems. Regulation, I suggest, is a key state 
resource, degraded here to another rent-seeking activity. It is this that is vital for securing 
adequate homes—something that is often elided in calls to formalize insecure property 
rights, to help the economically marginalised (see van der Molen’s 2012 discussion of 
these debates following de Soto, 2002). Indeed, as the ethnography indicates, ratifying 
property rights or failing to help those indebted through currency flotation can create 
homelessness. 
 
Finally, the form of Almaty’s recent housing protests is revealing about the current 
relationship between people and state bodies. Highlighting the authorities’ disregard of 
the law was standard late Soviet practice, as were hunger strikes and public marches, all 
still common, although increasingly suppressed. But the suicide of evicted mortgagees 
and the violence of the Shanyrak event have been profoundly shocking. One, the ultimate 
expression of anomie, the other showing a ferocity quite alien to how urban protest for 
rights has conventionally been performed. Both suggest a desperation to achieve moral 
citizenship rights to housing and the city—or simply hopelessness. The state’s failure to 
provide secure and adequate housing for the people on whom its claims to legitimacy and 
hopes for stability rest, recapitulates the increasingly unstable foundation of both homes 
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i The Soviet name was Alma-Ata, later changed to ‘Almaty’. I use only the latter for simplicity. 
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ii Such precarious groups are large. In Shanyrak, the official population was reported as 160,000 in 
2016 but local officials said their ‘working’ population was 220,000 to include unregistered, 
‘invisible’ tenants (cf Sanghra et al, 2012).  
iii I have carried out fieldwork in Almaty and or Shanyrak from 2000-2016. 
